Estate disputes often rest on a fragile balance between testamentary intent and certain legal safeguards that protect vulnerable testators from improper third-party influence[1]. A recent decision[2] by the Mississippi Court of Appeals highlights this delicate balance and provides commentary on Mississippi’s treatment of undue influence, the role of witness credibility, and the evidentiary burdens faced by contestants of wills. In this case, the Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed the Copiah County Chancery Court’s admission of the decedent’s 1999 will, her 2001 codicil, and her 2013 second codicil to probate, rejecting multiple challenges by one of the decedent’s sisters.
Background and Procedural History
The history of the decedent’s relevant testamentary documents spanned more than a decade, beginning with a 1998 conservatorship over decedent of which her sister, Karen, was conservator. A 1999 will devised decedent’s real property to her nieces (Karen’s daughters), Nicole and Claire, and the remainder of her estate among additional family members, including her mother, Barbara. Two years later, a 2001 codicil merely substituted her alternate executor, an administrative change of little substantive consequence. Changes to her testamentary plan in following years, however, introduced complexities that would eventually lead to intra-family litigation.
By 2012, the decedent was diagnosed with stage 3 colon cancer, with her sister Karen serving as primary caregiver. That same year, the decedent and Karen became entangled in a legal dispute with their other sister, Susan, over land inherited by their father. The same attorney represented both decedent and Karen in that matter, and he later drafted decedent’s second codicil, executed in June 2013. The second codicil maintained prior family devises but notably adjusted the distribution of real property and added modest cash bequests to additional relatives.
The decedent’s deteriorating health prompted her move to Karen’s home in early 2014. A subsequent will drafted that April (by a different attorney) substantially altered her estate plan, granting the residue of her property to Karen and Claire while reducing other family gifts to $1,000 each. Following decedent’s death in 2015, decedent’s and Karen’s other sister, Susan, sought letters of administration, while Karen petitioned to probate the 2014 will. The chancery court, finding both actual and presumed undue influence in that instrument, set aside the 2014 will. The Court of Appeals affirmed that decision to set aside the 2014 will.[3]
Years later in 2021, Karen petitioned to probate the decedent’s original 1999 will and accompanying codicils. Susan again filed a caveat, arguing that the second codicil was the product of undue influence and that the decedent lacked testamentary capacity. The chancery court admitted the 1999 will and both codicils to probate, appointing Karen executor. On appeal, the Court of Appeals found no reversible error.
The Standard of Review
The Court reiterated that a chancellor’s findings of fact will not be disturbed unless “manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous” or predicated on an erroneous legal standard.[4] Deference to the chancery court is particularly pronounced where factual determinations turn on witness credibility and demeanor, which are matters the appellate court cannot independently assess.
The Motion in Limine and Waiver
Susan’s first claim, that the chancery court erred in excluding evidence of decedent’s alleged diminished mental capacity[5], was swiftly rejected. The Court found that Susan’s briefing failed to articulate argument or authority beyond the bare assignment of error. As the Court observed, “[t]he law is well established that points not argued in the brief on appeal are abandoned and waived” and “[f]ailure to cite relevant authority obviates the appellate court’s obligation to review such issues.”[6] The exclusion of a 1978 IQ test, conducted more than thirty-five years before execution of the contested codicil, therefore stood unchallenged on appeal.
Witness Credibility and the Chancellor’s Discretion
Susan’s second assignment of error targeted the chancery court’s credibility determinations, particularly regarding the attorney who prepared the 1999 will and codicils thereto, Karen, and a former friend named Renee. The Court reiterated the long-standing rule that credibility assessments lie squarely within the discretion of the chancellor, who alone observes witness demeanor.[7]
The drafting attorney’s testimony proved central, as he described the decedent as lucid, independent, and deliberate. Though Karen had arranged the meeting, the attorney testified that she did not attend the signing, and the attorney’s paralegal corroborated this account. The chancellor credited the attorney as an “independent third party” in the best position to observe the testatrix’s capacity.
Susan argued that prior findings of Karen’s lack of credibility in the previous trial and appeal (setting aside the 2014 will for undue influence) should control. Yet, while the chancellor took judicial notice of those earlier judgments, he expressly found Karen’s testimony in the present proceeding credible and transparent. As to Renee, the appellate court did not alter the chancellor’s determination that her testimony unreliable, citing emotional bias stemming from a fractured friendship. Because “this Court may not intercede simply to substitute our collective opinion for that of the chancellor,”[8] the appellate panel deferred to those determinations.
The Presumption and Rebuttal of Undue Influence
Susan’s primary challenge centered on whether Karen successfully rebutted the presumption of undue influence arising from her confidential relationship with the decedent. To overcome such a presumption, the proponent must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that she (1) acted in good faith, (2) that the testator had full knowledge and deliberation in executing the will, and (3) that the testator exhibited independent consent and action.[9]
Applying these factors, the Court affirmed the chancellor’s findings on each. The record supported Karen’s good faith, as no evidence showed coercion or undue participation in drafting the codicil, and the drafting attorney’s testimony (along with his paralegal’s) confirmed the decedent’s autonomy. On the question of capacity and deliberation, expert testimony from a physician who reviewed the decedent’s medical records and consulted with decedent’s family established that the decedent possessed sufficient mental capacity in June 2013, when the second codicil was executed. The Court emphasized that an existing conservatorship does not automatically deprive an individual of testamentary competence.[10]
Finally, the evidence supported the decedent’s independent consent and action. Although Karen paid the drafting attorney’s fees related to the earlier land dispute, there was no proof that she influenced the testamentary process. The attorney and his paralegal testified that the decedent came to the office alone, engaged meaningfully in discussion, and understood her decisions. The chancellor, finding this testimony credible and uncontradicted, concluded that decedent’s execution of the 2013 codicil was voluntary and informed. The appellate court found substantial credible evidence supporting the chancellor’s finding that Karen overcame the presumption of undue influence and accordingly affirmed the decision.
Conclusion
The Sojourner decision underscores Mississippi’s consistent deference to chancellors in will contests hinging on credibility and mental capacity. It reinforces that the presumption of undue influence, while a powerful safeguard, remains rebuttable through credible, independent evidence of good faith and deliberation. Equally significant, the Court’s ruling clarifies that the existence of a conservatorship or familial caregiving relationship does not alone invalidate testamentary intent. In affirming the chancery court, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed a fundamental principle of Mississippi probate jurisprudence, that appellate review is not a vehicle for re-trying fact-intensive family disputes, but rather a means to ensure that a chancellor’s findings rest upon substantial, credible evidence.
[1] See my previous article on Will contests in Mississippi here: https://esapllc.com/will-contests-in-mississippi-2024/
[2] In the Matter of the Estate of Lisa Holly Sojourner, Deceased: Campbell v. Sojourner, No. 2024-CA-00301-COA (Miss. Ct. App. 2025)
[3] Sojourner v. Campbell, 269 So. 3d 259 (Miss. Ct. App. 2018).
[4] Wright v. Roberts, 797 So. 2d 992, 997 (Miss. 2001) (quoting In re Estate of Grantham, 609 So. 2d 1220, 1223 (Miss. 1992)).
[5] The chancellor granted the motion in limine to exclude decedent’s intelligence or mental aptitude test dated May 31, 1978, which had been conducted over thirty-five years before the second codicil was executed.
[6] In re Conservatorship of Redd v. Redd, 332 So. 3d 250, 258 (Miss. 2021) (quoting Arrington v. State, 267 So. 3d 753, 756 (Miss. 2019)).
[7] Catlett v. Catlett, 358 So. 3d 366, 375 (Miss. Ct. App. 2023), and Atkins v. Moore, 352 So. 3d 217, 226 (Miss. Ct. App. 2022)
[8] In re Est. of Hitt v. Hart, 338 So. 3d 681, 691 (Miss. Ct. App. 2023)
[9] Noblin v. Burgess, 54 So. 3d 282, 288 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010).
[10] Mask v. Elrod (In re Est. of Mask), 703 So. 2d 852, 856 (Miss. 1997).
